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1 Imperial systems of power,
colonial forces and the making
of modern Southeast Asia
Karl Hack with Tobias Rettig
Why do colonial subjects choose to enlist and to court death under the com-
mand of ofﬁcers who come from thousands of miles away? Under what condi-
tions do they stay loyal? When, why and with what results do they revolt?
Questions such as these can be answered only with the greatest difﬁculty. In
part this is because comparative work on colonial forces is rare, restricted to a
few short introductions to edited volumes, whose collections of articles at ﬁrst
seem to invite contrast, rather than comparison.
1 This is compounded by a
second problem: the careless use of concepts. The terms colonial armies, coloni-
alism and imperialism have been employed so loosely as to spread confusion.
2
For this reason, we must begin by examining the terminology surrounding ‘colo-
nial armies’ and what we call ‘imperial systems of power’.
3
The linguistics of domination
First of all, colonialism must be distinguished from colonisation. ‘Colonisation’ is
the settlement, by members of one cultural group, of a territory occupied by
people distinct from them, when also accompanied by an attempt to dominate
the space settled. Where fully successful, this constitutes a settler colony, as
deﬁned under Fieldhouse’s ﬁvefold classiﬁcation of colonies as: settler, mixed,
plantation, occupation and trade (Table 1.1).
4
Settlers have a strong interest in arming themselves, at their own expense,
against people whose lands they intrude upon. When settlers win independence
their armies can in turn become instruments of oppression against indigenous
remnants, employing their own ‘colonial’ forces. One example of this is the
Native Americans who were formally recruited as Scouts from 1866 by the
United States Army, and used in campaigns against other Native Americans.
5
Colonisation is thus one subcategory of the wider phenomenon of colonialism.
The term ‘colony’ or colonial territory has come to mean a territory with three
key attributes. First, it is ruled as a unit that is administratively distinct from a
ruling power’s core territory. Or at least it comes to be treated differently, if only
as a result of local revolt.
6 Second, there is a lack of consent from the population
ruled.
7 Third, the majority of the colonial territory’s population is culturally
distinct from that of the ruling power.
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With regard to the lack of consent, for settler and occupation colonies, this
often means acquisition by force. For territories subject to formal agreements
(such as protectorate treaties), it may mean submission in fear of violence (per-
haps under the glare of gunboats) or by a narrow elite who take a collaborative
role. The point where a distinct sense of identity exists, meanwhile, can vary
from ﬁrst contact to a time when the population of a previously quiescent area
gains a new sense of sharply differentiated identity and interest.
8
The core requirement for deﬁning colonial forces is that they are raised from
within territories that qualify as ‘colonial’ in the above sense; or they are raised
from non-metropolitan populations for the purpose of dominating overseas terri-
tories. Additional tendencies include being at least part-funded by the territories
such forces are raised in or stationed in. Colonial forces are not necessarily
‘indigenous’, however, either to the country of recruitment or to the country of
posting. They may be, though. For instance, the Malay Regiment was consti-
tuted from Malays from British Malaya, and remained locally based. Timorese,
meanwhile, were encouraged to form pro-Indonesia militia groups in East Timor
in the 1970s to 1990s. A special case would be those colonial guardians who
were local-born or resident but not ‘indigenous’, such as many of Singapore’s
nineteenth- to early twentieth-century volunteers (part-time territorial forces).
These included separate companies for Europeans, Eurasians, Chinese, Indians
and Malays, with rates of compensation differing by ‘race’.
More often than not, however, colonial troops are not indigenous to the
country they are serving in. Hence the Algerian Zouaves for France, like the
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Gurkhas for Britain, were widely deployed outside their area of recruitment,
notably in Indochina; likewise, the Tirailleurs Sénégalais in French West Africa and
elsewhere, and also the Indian troops garrisoned in British Burma and Malaya.
Similarly, Southeast Asians were also deployed in areas they were alien to:
Vietnamese soldiers served in East Asia, Europe and Africa, while Moluccan,
Timorese, Alfurian and Madurese soldiers took part in the Dutch conquest of
Indonesia. In this way, the forces in any one colonial territory may include
local conscripts, full- or part-time volunteers or militias (variously drawn from
indigenous peoples, settlers, ‘mestizo’ recruits or even recent immigrants) and
recruits from other colonial territories.
The important distinction for ‘colonial’ forces is thus the contrast between
their recruitment at a periphery, in contrast to control emanating from a distant,
and for the most part culturally distinct, core or ‘metropolitan’ territory. Their
functions may vary greatly, from contributing to the security of a single colonial
territory, through posting abroad in service of transcolonial security, to service in
defence of the core territory that controls them, directly or indirectly as war
industry labour and auxiliaries.
‘Colonial forces’ might thus be thought of as encompassing all who serve
directly and indirectly in support of an imperial military system. This might
require new typologies, which recognise a whole spectrum of forces, from the
elite volunteer, through conscripts, militias, partisans, auxiliaries, coolies and
defence labourers, to military and sexual slaves. In the Japanese case these
categories encompass both the 250,000 Asian romusha (labourers inveigled by a
mix of coercion through local leaders, and deception over conditions), of whom
at least 60,000 died helping to build the Burma–Thailand railway in 1942–3,
and the ‘comfort women’ or military sex slaves of 1931–45.
9
Core deﬁnitions of imperialism and colonialism
Imperialism itself we take to be the domination by one state – a core – of the
effective sovereignty of one or more separate areas – ‘peripheries’. Colonialism is
a subcategory of imperialism. In colonialism, domination involves de jure or de
facto metropolitan rights and responsibilities over the dominated area. This is
described below as formal imperialism. As such, colonialism can be thought of as
further subdividing into Fieldhouse’s ﬁve types of colonial territory, spanning
from settler colony to protectorate and ‘factory’. Beyond colonialism, imper-
ial policies may dominate other areas while disclaiming permanent or semi-
permanent rights. This is another subcategory of imperialism, described below
as informal imperialism.
Either way, the policy areas dominated may include either internal or external
policies, or a combination of both. The ‘periphery’ so dominated may be con-
tiguous, or lie over the seas. But it must constitute a separate administrative unit,
be dominated without the explicit consent of most of its people and have a
population that has, or develops, a distinct culture and sense of identity and
interests. Imperialism encompasses the whole process of such domination.
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Formal imperialism
Formal imperialism or colonialism involves the core territory assuming respons-
ibilities for a peripheral area. The area so dominated tends to be styled a colony
if domination extends over both internal and external policies. If there is
an agreement transferring more limited aspects of sovereignty – for instance,
defence and external affairs only, or limited to the right to ‘advise’ – it is likely to
be given a term reﬂecting this limited scope, such as protectorate.
Formal imperialism or colonialism is largely a matter of a legal or de facto
international status, by which the core’s rights and responsibilities over the peri-
phery are made manifest. But that does not tell us how a colony or protectorate
is protected. The style of dominance can be further divided into methods of
direct imperialism and of indirect imperialism.
Direct and indirect imperialism
At its extreme, direct imperialism implies a monopoly or near-monopoly over
the key functions of state in the peripheral area. Such functions include the use
of force and judicial and tax-raising activities. Direct imperial methods include
raising regular, and regularly paid and drilled, police and soldiers. Such soldiers
might serve under non-indigenous ofﬁcers down to at least battalion, if not
company or platoon, level, with indigenous NCOs helping to bridge the linguistic
and cultural gap between foreigner and colonial recruit.
Indirect approaches to imperialism involve devolving signiﬁcant aspects of
state functions to subordinate, localised authorities. These authorities are as
often as not declared to be traditional or entrenched ‘native’ representatives:
sultans, rajas, chiefs, penghulu (village heads) or even Kapitan China (prominent
Chinese allowed to hold sway over their own community in speciﬁed areas) and
secret society leaders. The sub-contracting of state and military functions to a
third party, such as mercenaries or companies, could also be classiﬁed under this
rubric.
This means that ‘colonial armies’ also include ‘indirect’ colonial forces; that is,
the enforcers enlisted by lesser, local authorities. In the nineteenth- to early
twentieth-century Netherlands East Indies, some local ofﬁcials relied on jagos
(literally  ﬁghting roosters or cocks) or village toughs to help to enforce their
decisions, while in the American-ruled Philippines prominent families developed
what became virtually private armies.
10 In both cases, it has been argued that
this left, and still leaves, a postcolonial legacy of non-state violence, which col-
ours politics and governance for the worse.
In terms of colonial armies, the British East India Company on the Indian
subcontinent took an increasingly direct approach from the mid-eighteenth cen-
tury, recruiting Indians as sepoys (soldiers), directly in company pay, under
British ofﬁcers. Yet in nineteenth-century Malaya and Singapore the British
initially took a more indirect approach, encouraging the cooperation of Kapitan
China. The Portuguese in East Timor, meanwhile, still placed a signiﬁcant
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emphasis on raising native levies through local chiefs, the liurai, into the early
twentieth century. These levies perpetuated militia ‘repertoires of violence’, which
were later tapped by pro-Indonesia militias, right up to 1999.
11
Direct and indirect approaches are not mutually exclusive. Territories might
employ a mix of both, typically beginning with greater elements of indirect rule,
and moving towards using more direct methods as state formation and increased
tax revenues made this possible.
Informal imperialism
In addition to the contrast between direct and indirect techniques of dominance,
there is a contrast between formal and informal imperialism. Formal imperialism
involves assuming de facto or de jure responsibilities for an area; informal imperial-
ism functions in the absence of these. It employs threats, ﬁnancial dominance
and ‘gunboat diplomacy.’
Domination is taken to mean the ability to inﬂuence policy in a funda-
mental and persistent manner, as and when needed; for instance, by enforcing
extraterritorial rights or replacing unsatisfactory rulers. When people talk of a
Pax Britannica, or of a twenty-ﬁrst-century American Empire, or of a ﬁfteenth-
century maritime Pax Ming, it is informal imperialism that is meant, with its
determination to dictate developments in ‘failed’ or ‘rogue states’, and states that
are seen as threatening international norms of trade and diplomacy. Examples
range from Western imposition of extraterritorial jurisdiction on a range of
Asian states such as China and Thailand (allowing Westerners to be tried under
their own laws), to American intervention in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003).
12
Such ‘Pax’, informal imperialism and ‘spheres of inﬂuence’ tend to be a func-
tion of empires operating towards the outer reaches of their geographical limit,
or of world powers wishing to avoid excessive accumulations of extra colonies
and responsibilities. At this margin, the imperial powers tend to prefer informal
domination to direct rule, and to keep the duration of any intervention limited.
13
Imperial systems of power
Beyond these terms, we refer in this chapter to imperial systems of power.
Why distinguish this extra layer? Here we note that some historians and
political scientists have argued that imperialism should be distinguished from
colonialism.
For Jürgen Osterhammel, ‘colonialism’ involves the intricacies of ruling indi-
vidual colonies; it is the art of domination. By contrast, he argues that ‘imperial-
ism’ is about creating systems of power, and the related attempt to exercise great
power politics. For Dominic Lieven, an expert on Russia, empires are ‘very great
powers’ that dominate many territories and peoples and inﬂuence global politics.
For him, the greatest empires also espouse something like a high religion or
culture. They seek to impose their worldview, not only by means of the stick and
carrot, but also by providing an overarching hegemonic idea for emulation.
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One thinks of Britain’s economic globalisation (free trade imperialism) of the
nineteenth century, and of George Bush’s declaratory political globalism (sup-
porting the spread of democracy and freedom). The latter was boldly stated at
the swearing-in ceremony for his second term as President in January 2005.
14
For these authors, then, empire is more than colonial. It is transcolonial, and
global: it involves relations between the parts of a wider imperial system. On this
model, colonial security would be the art of dominating and protecting indi-
vidual states, while imperial security would be the art of operating broad power
systems. Colonial security would concern itself with this frontier and that gar-
rison, while the imperial system broods over strategic reserves, and how to keep
major shipping ways ﬂowing, such as the Suez and Panama Canals, and Straits
of Hormuz and Melaka.
15
We hold that reserving the title of empire for these largest few systems, and
the name of imperialism for their practice, is as philologically illogical as it is
appealing in its clarity. Except for narrow heuristic purposes, it is doomed by its
deﬁance of common usage and dictionary deﬁnition. It is also unsatisfactory in
excluding events within a single colony, or acts by a minor power, from the
category of imperial, and in focusing on scale more than the qualitative nature of
imperialism. We reject this imperial versus colonial distinction. Instead we adopt
a further idea – that of an imperial system of power – to describe the military–
political–economic–diplomatic matrixes developed to preserve dominance on a
wider scale.
If it is necessary to identify the very greatest superpowers from common or
garden empires (superpowers that have built security systems spanning most of
Direct rule
Direct control over troops, tax,
law. State officers downwards,
even to sub-unit and local levels
Formal rule




Minimal or no formal and
treaty rights. Spheres of
influence, gunboat diplomacy
Indirect rule
Forces, tax, etc. under local
leaders. Functions
contracted or farmed out
Figure 1.1 The spectrum of formal/informal and direct/indirect domination.
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the world known to them, such as Rome, Spain, Britain, the Soviet Union and
the contemporary United States), one might deﬁne them as having, or seeking,
global imperial systems of power. The idea of a system of imperial power is
useful, because it also highlights how the term ‘colonial armies’ is too narrow in
focus. In choosing to use ‘colonial armies’ in the title, we are not so much
afﬁrming traditional notions of their study as beginning a campaign to re-
examine, redeﬁne and relocate them. Imperial domination has as often as not
relied upon complex and variegated complexes or systems of power, of which
armies are but one part.
Imperial systems of power also have deﬁning characteristics, despite not neces-
sarily being self-consciously operated as systems. They are transcolonial or global
rather than merely colonial, and they must be underpinned by ﬁnancial strength.
16
They project power not only by metropolitan armed forces, but also by some
combination of overseas reach in the forms of bases, aircraft, alliances, disburse-
ments and, in the case of maritime empires, ships. In this regard, Chapter 2,
‘The demography of domination’, looks at the vital role steamships and gunships
played in the ‘new imperialism’ of the latter part of the nineteenth century.
The ‘colonial army’, then, is just one component of any given system, though
one that remains vital if domination is to prove sustainable in manpower and
ﬁnancial terms.
17 Max Boot has argued that the lack of such ‘colonial’ or at
least ‘foreign legion’ troops is a formidable barrier to the United States taking
the challenges of world policing more seriously. Who is to do the dirty work
of  ‘nation-building’ in failed states, and of browbeating rogue states, as the
body-bags ﬂow from the likes of Iraq? He suggests that a foreign and illegal
immigrant-manned  ‘Freedom Legion’ can provide the shock troops for this.
These politically expendable imperial forces – more acceptable body-bag ﬁllers
than boys from the Midwest and New York – could have citizenship as their
reward. Why citizenship should be needed in addition to a good salary relative
to their homelands is unclear, unless it is to avoid the tag ‘mercenary’. Presum-
ably such forces would ﬁt into the larger post-2001 picture of the United States
cobbling together ‘coalitions of the willing’ for speciﬁc interventions, and sub-
contracting military and intelligence functions to commercial companies and
other governments.
Max Boot’s British and French predecessors would have shuddered at this
ﬁnancial imprudence. For colonial armies were important not only for their
willing and expendable recruits, but also because local salaries were cheaper
than metropolitan. Even then the colonies usually paid. This reveals a serious
tension in the contemporary American position. It has the most far-reaching
system of imperial power the world has seen, but without colonies to fund a true
‘colonial army’. Hence the core power has to pay for most things. Unless, of
course, Max Boot and American neoconservatives revive Athens’ wheeze in the
Delian League, and have key allies’ bankrolling of American-raised forces made
regular, rather than ad hoc.
18
Colonial troops in the narrow sense thus constitute a vital component of
imperial power, but are still only one of several components. They are also just
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one way in which imperial territories can be turned into security producers,
rather than mere security consumers, with others providing their hosting bases,
providing labour and making ﬁnancial contributions.
Taking all these deﬁnitions and issues together, this book does not merely take
‘colonial armies’ as unproblematic, and offer chapters on micro-aspects of such
forces. Instead, it offers a series of chapters that provoke questions about the very
nature of imperial force.
Three themes: imperial systems; discourses of loyalty
and revolt; and Asian imperialism
The chapters in this book fall into three broad themes, namely: imperial systems
of power; discourses of ‘martial races’, loyalty and revolt; and the need to extend
the imperial paradigm to Asian-run ‘colonial armies’ and to the ‘postcolonial’
era in Asia.
Systems and patterns of imperial power
Several chapters touch on the issue of wider systems of imperial power: some by
looking at the macro-picture; others by examining microcosms that reveal sys-
temic stresses. Gerke Teitler’s Chapter 6, ‘The mixed company: ﬁghting power
and ethnic relations in the Dutch colonial army, 1890–1920’, shows how difﬁcult
it was for the Netherlands to raise enough troops to secure the Netherlands
Indies. The Dutch had one of the smallest domestic populations. In 1900 this
meant  ﬁve million, compared to 40 million subjects spread over the several
thousand islands in the Indies. The Dutch struggled as a result to ﬁnd sufﬁcient
European ofﬁcers – despite recruiting many non-Dutch Europeans – and to ﬁnd
sufﬁcient troops from groups they trusted, such as the so-called ‘Ambonese’. The
latter were mainly Christian converts from small spice islands over a thousand
kilometres to the east of Java.
19
Henri Eckert, meanwhile, shows how, in Indochina in the 1880s and 1890s,
the shaping of colonial forces had as much to do with debates between republi-
cans and royalists in France, between Navy and Army ofﬁcers in Vietnam and
between the French army and civilians as with events on the ground. His Chap-
ter 5, ‘Double-edged swords of conquest in Indochina: Tirailleurs Tonkinois, Chasseurs
Annamites and militias, 1885–1895’, shows just how far European games were
played out in Asia, as well as revealing the tensions between direct and indirect
approaches to early colonial armies. While Teitler’s chapter looks at recruitment
issues and Eckert’s at issues of control, the editors tell in Chapter 2 of the French
use of Indochinese soldiers and labour in Europe from the middle of the First
World War.
Three chapters take a more explicitly macrocosmic approach to systems of
imperial power. Abu Talib Ahmad in Chapter 9, ‘The impact of the Japanese
occupation on colonial and anti-colonial armies in Southeast Asia’, surveys the
impact of the Japanese period on Southeast Asia, covering anti-Japanese armies
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as well as Japanese-sponsored forces, and militias as well as regulars. He shows
how Japanese weakness as much as Japanese strength fuelled increased use of
local militias after 1943, as well as permitting a growth in the scale and inﬂuence
of anti-Japanese armies in Burma, Malaya and the Philippines. Both Japanese-
sponsored and anti-Japanese forces were to mark the postwar period, and Abu
Talib notes the importance of the Japanese emphasis on seishin in training, their
version of disciplined, hardened, indomitable martial spirit that could make up
for technological inferiority.
Karl Hack’s Chapter 10, ‘Imperialism and decolonisation in Southeast Asia:
colonial forces and British world power’, surveys a still broader period, from the
nineteenth century to the present day. It argues that British territories in South-
east Asia produced as well as consumed security. It does this by showing how the
area consumed security in the form of troops from India and Royal Navy protec-
tion, but produced it in terms of bases, agreements, guaranteeing the free ﬂow of
international trade in the Melaka Straits (then written ‘Straits of Malacca’) and
being an empire ‘dollar arsenal’ to the 1950s and beyond.
20 That is, Malaya’s
dollar-earning rubber and tin helped to subsidise Britain’s dollar-deﬁcient trade
from the interwar to the Cold War periods.
Hack’s chapter further shows how only a systemic approach can make sense
of British decisions and forces in the region. This ranges from Britain’s use of
indirect models of imperial security – for instance, using Chinese leaders to
control Chinese subjects – to the decisions that led to a relatively benign
post-1945 decolonisation process. The latter happened as Britain – once it had
accepted that a gradual evolution towards self-government was inevitable post-
Second World War – prioritised the development of working relationships with
stable, friendly postcolonial elites. Such relationships were seen as the key to
producing postcolonial states that would cooperate with Britain, and so underpin
continuing British world power.
Perhaps even more intriguingly, Geoff Wade’s Chapter 3, ‘Ming colonial
armies in Southeast Asia’, takes the systemic approach back in time. His chapter
challenges us to see ﬁfteenth-century Ming Chinese expansion into western
Yunnan and Vietnam, and the epic voyages of Admiral Zheng He (Cheng Ho)
across the South Seas and Indian Ocean, as Asian, and more speciﬁcally Chi-
nese, forms of imperialism. As we will argue below, reﬂection on the chapters by
Abu Talib, Hack and Wade leads to a further theme, which is just how the
biggest ‘global’ systems of imperial power – Ming, Japanese and British – helped
to shape Southeast Asia.
Discourses of loyalty, revolt and ‘martial races’
The second big theme is discourses and practices of martial races, loyalty and
revolt. Every imperial power wrestled with the fear that the main populations it
ruled – Burmans, Javanese, Malays, Vietnamese and Tagalogs – might prove
unreliable. Each constructed ‘knowledge’ about its populations, and the ‘martial’
qualities of these, in a way that was designed to underpin control. Put bluntly,
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Europeans in particular employed a ‘divide and rule’ approach that produced
‘plural armies’ to rule over plural societies.
21
Hence Taylor writes in his Chapter 9, ‘Colonial forces in British Burma: a
national army postponed’, that the true martial race of Burma, the lowland
Burmans who were feared enemies of the Siamese, were marginalised. The
British turned instead to Indian soldiers from the Raj, and Burmese ethnic
minorities, notably hilltribes that had been converted to Christianity.
Burma was conquered in three phases between 1824 and 1885, and then
made into a province of British India. By 1931 Burmans made up 75 per cent
of the population but just 12 per cent of the indigenous troops, as opposed to
Karens, Kachehs, Chins, Anglo-Burmese and Indians. The rise of nationalism
seems to have made the British no less averse to recruiting Burmans, though
Burma’s separation from the British Raj as a distinct colony in 1937 (with
limited internal self-government), and the approach of war, made compromise
inevitable. In 1939–41 the percentage of Burmans among new recruits rose to
28.5 per cent. But this still left a severe underrepresentation as a proportion of
the regular army (19 per cent), and more so in the armed services as a whole
(13 per cent).
Taylor notes that, in response to these limitations, nationalists raised militias.
More famously, Aung San and the ‘thirty comrades’ left the country to receive
Japanese military training in 1941, only to return with their Japanese sponsors
at the head of what became a ‘Burma Independence Army’, and ultimately the
‘Burmese Patriotic Forces’ after they switched sides to the British in 1945. Taylor
shows how parts of this predominantly Burman force were integrated into the
postwar army, and its leaders rose to high position.
It seems that colonial discourse on martial races was a technique of ‘divide
and rule’ that cemented control before 1941, but backﬁred afterwards. It helped
to produce a postwar country where minorities possessed military traditions
cemented by the British training, but where a Burman elite was determined to
limit the former’s regional autonomy. This Burman elite also emerged with a
distrust of the British who had refused to recruit them in large numbers before
the war. This history helped to underpin endemic conﬂict between government
and minorities from 1948 onwards.
22
For French Indochina, Chapters 4 and 5 by Womack and Eckert, together
with Rettig’s article on ‘French military policies in the aftermath of Yên Bay
mutiny, 1930’, show how the French failed to recognise the ethnic Vietnamese
(kinh) as a potential ‘martial race’. This despite a history of ﬁerce anti-Chinese
struggle, of an often bloody Vietnamese colonisation drive southwards and of
internal wars.
23
Locally recruited French forces in Indochina did come to be composed mainly
of kinh soldiers. But this was a matter of grudging necessity, since France did
not have a virtually inexhaustible ‘barrack in the eastern seas’, as the British
did in India. Nor could they rely heavily on ethnic minorities, as the hill tribes
were subjected after the conquest of the lowlands and delta regions. Instead,
the French tapped into precolonial Vietnamese administrative traditions –
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themselves Chinese-inﬂuenced  – to conscript local soldiers. Even when hill
tribes were recruited, notably from the 1920s when rising Vietnamese national-
ism worried the French, their small numbers limited their potential.
The ironic exception to French refusal to use the Vietnamese as a ‘martial
race’ is noted by Sarah Womack’s Chapter 4, ‘Ethnicity and martial races: the
Garde indigène of Cambodia in the 1880s and 1890s’. Womack looks at French
tactics in putting down a revolt in its Cambodian protectorate, in 1885–6. She
argues that the French discourses on the Khmer and Vietnamese formed images
of both as poor and untrustworthy soldiers. But despite this, Womack demon-
strates how non-Khmer Vietnamese (then called Annamese) of the Civil Guard
were deliberately deployed in Cambodia. Divide and rule temporarily took prec-
edence over stereotypes of the Vietnamese as poor soldiers and police.
The Dutch in the East Indies and the Americans in the Philippines also had
problems identifying acceptable ‘martial races’, as shown by Teitler’s Chapter 6
on the Netherlands Indies and Richard Meixsel’s Chapter 7 on the Philippines.
Forty years of dogged resistance (1873 to the early twentieth century) turned the
Acehnese, in Dutch eyes, into Muslim fanatics rather than a reliable martial
race. Nor did the Dutch see the Javanese as made of the right stuff. The Java-
nese, who provided the bulk of the Indies’ population, could too easily turn out
to be a threat to Dutch supremacy if predominant in the army.
Hence from the second half of the nineteenth century the Dutch nurtured
Moluccans, peoples from the east of the archipelago who had been subjected
during the conquest of the spice islands in the seventeenth and eighteenth cen-
turies. In particular they turned the so-called ‘Ambonese’ into a privileged
‘martial race’. The Ambonese became so closely identiﬁed with Dutch service
that they were sometimes referred to as black Dutchmen. As with the French,
however, the preferred martial races were small in number compared to the
overall population, and the result was grudging reliance on the Javanese as the
largest recruiting pool for a colonial army that was also very much a plural
army.
The United States also chose to minimise recruitment of Tagalogs as Scouts,
the American term for their Filipino troops. The Tagalogs, the majority on the
most populous island of Luzon, had been at the forefront of the Philippine
rebellion against Spain from 1896, and then of the resistance against American
takeover in 1898–1901. In 1924, only 5 per cent of the Philippine Division was
Tagalog. The Americans preferred to recruit from other ‘tribes’, most notably
the Macabebe, who had been recruited ﬁrst for the Spanish in 1896.
24 Only the
growing need to recruit more educated soldiers, and distance from the events of
1898–1901, allowed more Tagalog recruitment. Overall, however, the Amer-
icans appeared relatively uninterested in their local soldiers. Tours of duty for
American ofﬁcers were generally as little as two years, and these same ofﬁcers
were too often of mediocre quality, or demonstrated a lack of interest in the
indigenous rank and ﬁle. The advent of the Commonwealth of the Philippines in
1935 threatened more dramatic developments in local forces, but delivered little
before the Japanese swept across the islands in 1941–2.
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For the most part, then, and in contrast to the British in India, the other
European powers refused to see candidates for large-scale ‘martial races’. This
was partly a matter of reluctance to overrely on recently conquered and paciﬁed
majorities, but was also partly due to cultural prejudices, which resulted in a kind
of martial ‘orientalism’. Asians might be disparaged as effeminate or not  steady
in open, shock battle, or Asian martial traditions were written off as marauding
and piracy.
25 Womack’s Chapter 4 describes, for instance, the perceived femininity
of the longhaired and small Vietnamese soldiers. Europeans may have suffered
from a superﬁcial confusion between outward appearance and social graces, and
martial ability. Local styles of warfare may also have played a part, by failing to
conform to Western conceptions of manly behaviour. In many cases Southeast
Asians did not seek open battle if they thought that losses might be excessive.
This was in stark contrast to some colonial encounters in Africa or India.
This lack of appreciation of local styles of warfare, and the need to maintain
European superiority by denying native soldiers manly qualities, meant that the
majority of those recruited must have been aware of their colonial masters’
ambivalence. They would have felt that they were not being groomed as an
honoured military caste, when contrasted to the more favoured troops from
other colonies such as British-recruited Indians or French-recruited Zouaves,
and from the minorities of their own lands. By contrast, the favoured few showed
how a sense of being a military caste could be created. This was the case with
Moluccan soldiers subject to high expectations and good pay.
It seems that colonial powers created for themselves a dilemma. The very
nature of colonial rule – which required people to take higher risks in distant
lands, and to endure absence from metropolitan career ladders and networks
– required payment of a premium to secure ‘white’ ofﬁcers. In addition, the
recruitment of minorities, by their nature providing smaller recruitment pools, as
rank and ﬁle and as NCOs often required their preferential treatment.
The result of treating Europeans and minorities differently was that colonial
armies were plural armies, though the particular approach to plural forces varied
from one European power to another. For instance, the British recruited groups
into communally distinct platoons and even battalions, the Dutch did likewise
to begin with, but then mixed different ethnic groups from the Acehnese war,
and the Philippine Scout companies tended to see a single group predominate in
each one, but were also mixed.
The reliance on minorities and speciﬁc groups could work well where indigenous
martial traditions could be successfully drawn on, as in British India. But the reality
by the 1920s and 1930s was that expanding armies increasingly had to rely on
the majority populations for recruitment if they were to keep abreast of increas-
ing domestic and international threats. That meant more Vietnamese soldiers in
Indochina and more Javanese in the Indies. Britain found itself in a similar
dilemma. It reluctantly increased recruitment of the Malays in Malaya (into the
Malay Regiment from 1933), though it scarcely used the numerous Chinese
there at all. In Burma, Burmans remained a small minority in the army despite
their percentage in the military more than doubling between 1931 and 1939.
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There was thus a tension between imperial ambivalence about majority
populations and the need to increase their recruitment if colonial armies were to
face the growing international threats of the 1930s. An additional tendency was
the clash of the imperial prerogative of white control with the requirements of
efﬁciency, and for colonial forces to become under par for modern warfare.
The implications of all this were made clear by the Japanese onslaught, which
crushed British, American and Dutch controlled armies between December 1941
and early 1942. In short, colonial armies were ﬁne for policing, but a recipe
for disaster in a modern war, weakened by racialised hierarchies, the absence of
ethnic cohesion and a lack of a common sense of mission. There were echoes
here of Habsburg Austria’s performance during the First World War.
26 The
catastrophic series of failures from December 1941 called the whole basis of the
colonial paradigm into question.
We should not overdo the gloom or the deterministic slant. In many ways, the
amazing thing is that the vast majority of colonial forces proved so loyal up to
and including 1941. In the American Philippines, for instance, the only notable
mutiny, of 1924, was a ‘loyal’ revolt for better pay and conditions. Meixsel’s
Chapter 7 shows that despite problems, including a dismal linguistic gap between
American ofﬁcers and Filipino rank and ﬁle, the Filipino elite rallied behind the
Americans to condemn the 1924 Scout mutiny.
Perhaps even more pertinently, Philippine soldiers’ main fear in the 1930s was
that nationalism might undercut their relatively privileged position, in the sense of
pay and security compared to the alternatives. The establishment of the Com-
monwealth of the Philippines in 1935 with a large measure of self-government –
and the new government’s determination to build up its own defence force
– raised the spectre of a larger local military, and so the erosion of their status
and conditions. In fact, the Scout mutiny was soon forgotten, and remained
neglected in American and Filipino narratives of the American colonial period.
For colonial soldiers, the comparison that mattered was sometimes not their
inferior pay and status to European ofﬁcers, but their superior pay and security
compared to alternative forms of employment.
27
Even in what was arguably the most troublesome territory by the twentieth
century, Vietnam, the colonial army performed better than a quick glance might
a ﬁrst suggest. A nationalist-inspired mutiny of February 1930 proved abortive,
most dramatically at Yen Bay in northern Vietnam. Rettig’s 2002 article on
Yen Bay has already traced these themes. It shows how the vast majority of the
army remained reliable, despite a history of localised revolts, notably between
1908 and 1918. The nationalist-engineered Yen Bay mutiny of 1930 represented
something new. Though nipped in the bud by loyal forces, it was part of a Viet
Nam Quoc Dan Dang (VNQDD, Vietnamese Nationalist Party, along the lines
of China’s GMD) plan for simultaneous mutinies and insurrection. Rettig dis-
cusses the French paranoia and harsh surveillance and control measures that
followed, including executions and imprisonment, dismissals, rotating the major-
ity of soldiers, increased surveillance and largely futile attempts to keep a better
balance between Vietnamese and non-Vietnamese troops. More than 4.5 per
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cent of Tonkin’s 12,000 indigenous soldiers received some form of punishment.
But he also notes that Vietnamese militia forces (Garde indigène), and later troops
as well, proved reliable when used against a communist-directed, rural-based
revolt that followed hard on Yen Bay’s heels: the ‘Nghe-Tinh’ revolt of May
1930 to August 1931.
28
In Malaya, meanwhile, the British went one better. Both Hack’s Chapter 10
and Kevin Blackburn’s Chapter 12, ‘Colonial forces and postcolonial memories:
the Malay Regiment in Malaya and Singapore’, demonstrate how the British,
belatedly and in slightly sceptical mood, did test a majority Southeast Asian
population against its criteria for a ‘martial race’. Their chapters explain how
the British, by tapping Malay traditions of martial valour, and loyalty to their
Sultans, produced a small and initially experimental Malay unit in 1933. This
blossomed into the Malay Regiment, whose 1400 men fought the Japanese
bitterly in February 1942, even as white forces melted away around it.
Blackburn goes further still. He shows how discourses of loyalty and martial
tradition have been harnessed by postcolonial states for nationalist reasons.
The ﬁnal stand of the Malay Regiment at Pasir Panjang, in Singapore, on 13–14
February 1942 became the subject of contrasting nationalist historiographies
in Singapore and Malaysia. For Malaysia the Regiment became defenders of
Malay culture, martial tradition and self-conﬁdence. For Singapore the Regi-
ment became one example of different groups who fought, each in their own
way, in defence of what was to become a multiracial, meritocratic, independent
Singapore.
Issues of colonial force thus remain relevant into the ‘postcolonial era’, in
which they occupy places in memory in some cases as nationalist icons, as
Blackburn shows, and in others as anti-independence ﬁghters. Indonesia, for
instance, offers examples of those who fought against independence as envisaged
by core nationalists in Java and Sumatra. Three and a half thousand Moluccans
(including Ambonese) notably refused assimilation into the Republican Indone-
sian army they had fought, and after independence in 1949 accepted temporary
and eventually permanent exile in the Netherlands instead.
29
Blackburn thus suggests a distinct area of studies, namely postcolonial dis-
courses about ‘colonial forces’. This theme remains a potentially explosive sub-
ject in East Asia as well as Southeast Asia, with, for instance, more than 130,000
Koreans having served directly in the Japanese military (many as volunteers),
together with over 80,000 Taiwanese.
30
To return to Hack’s chapter, the British approach to martial forces fell hardest
in 1942. The surrender of over 100,000 troops to Japan in Singapore, on 15
February 1942, dealt a terrible blow to the idea of imperial guardianship. The
British response to the failure of their plural army in Malaya – it was almost half
Indian and comprised only a small percentage of locally recruited Asian regulars
– was dramatic. They returned in 1945, eschewing the model of trusteeship over
largely passive plural societies, and seeking partnership with populations.
31 They
aimed to turn Chinese, Indians, Malays and Eurasians into a ‘Malayan nation’,
which would ﬁnd a home in what might eventually become a ‘Dominion of
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Southeast Asia’, and so underpin a ‘Malayan’ army comprised of men from
all races. All this came at a time, in 1942–7, when Britain began to envisage
Dominions such as Australia, and perhaps India after independence in August
1947, partnering Britain in the coordination of their regional defence.
In short, ﬁnally and rather belatedly, the British abandoned the Europeans’
favoured mode of divide and rule, and instead aimed to ‘unite and quit’ by
means of nation and state-building, in a way that would produce postcolonial
states willing and able to cooperate in international defence. In fact it never quite
worked. Malay insistence on retaining the ‘Malay’ character of the ‘Malay Regi-
ment’ ensured that it continued to be both racially exclusive and the dominant
core around which multiracial supporting arms were assembled.
The other European colonial powers were all but extinguished during the
Second World War, and arguably had less developed images of postwar colonial
armies and postcolonial defence cooperation. Their main task after 1945 turned
out to be reoccupation – a second colonial occupation – and then ﬁghting
insurgencies that ultimately overstretched them, ﬁrst the Dutch by 1949, then
the French by 1954. The fact that neither Dutch nor French really recovered their
colonies’ rural and hill hinterlands re-emphasises the importance of the Japanese
occupation, as described in Abu Talib’s Chapter 9. It undermined colonial legiti-
macy, and produced large numbers of colonial subjects with the military training,
spirit and organisation required to mount sustained guerrilla campaigns.
These issues, of discourses of martial races and colonial forces, thus persist
across periods. The book emphasises this most forcefully by its choice of opening
and closing specialist chapters, namely Chapter 3 by Geoff Wade on Ming
China, Chapter 11 by Geoffrey Robinson on East Timor across the centuries
and Chapter 12 by Blackburn on the postcolonial memory of the Malay Regi-
ment. What these early and late chapters also have in common is that they raise
issues of Asian imperialism, and Asian memories of imperialism. This forms our
third overarching theme.
Asian imperialism and Asian memory of imperial armies
Colonial forces are not speciﬁcally a phenomenon of Western raising of Asian
forces, but also one of Asian raising of forces in peripheries, and to police
peripheries. Nor can imperial force be kept only as a category for analysing
a supposedly colonial pre-1960s, as opposed to a mythically ‘postcolonial’
post-1960s. Whether or not the imperial paradigm is useful depends on the
nature of core to periphery relations, not on questions of date or race.
While Blackburn’s treatment of the Malay Regiment is alluded to above,
Robinson’s chapter on the genealogy of local Timorese, and on ‘repertoires of
violence’ in Indonesia, demands additional explanation. His Chapter 11, ‘Colo-
nial militias in East Timor from the Portuguese period to independence’, starts
by asking how we explain pro-Indonesian militias’ rampage of destruction in
1999 East Timor, around the time of that territory’s vote for independence. His
answer is that two things combined. First, there was political manipulation of
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local forces by members of the Indonesian army intent on hiding behind subcon-
tracted forces. Second, there was the nature of the Timorese militias themselves.
Robinson argues that these drew on traditions, or violent ‘repertoires of action’,
that can be traced back to Portuguese times and beyond. Local levies, histori-
cally raised under liurai or local chiefs, had repertoires of action stressing demon-
strative display and destruction, and the taking of heads. The aims included
terrorising and intimidation.
Robinson’s picture hints at a wider pattern of Indonesian manipulation of
militias acquired in various anti-communist, anti-secessionist and anti-militant
Islam campaigns. These were waged not only in outlying territories but in Java
too. The generals and commandos who had been used in the massive purge of
the Indonesian Communist Party in 1965–6, for instance, included ofﬁcers who
had participated in the repression of the Outer Islands Revolt of 1956–8, the
Darul Islam Rebellions and the inﬁltration of Dutch New Guinea in 1961–2,
and who would later use this knowledge in the conquest of East Timor, the
maintenance of Suharto’s regime and the ﬁght for Aceh.
Robinson thus links precolonial, colonial and present-day Timor and Indone-
sia in a way that raises questions about the presence of ‘imperial’ forces in
modern Southeast Asia. It was in this spirit of pushing the boundaries that Geoff
Wade was invited to contribute Chapter 3, ‘Ming Colonial Armies in Southeast
Asia’. Where Blackburn and Robinson push the boundaries of ‘colonial armies’
forwards in time, Wade pushes them backwards. He asks whether one can talk of
Ming Chinese imperialism in Southeast Asia. Were the forces China sent south
and west ‘colonial’, and if so to what effect?
We may ﬁnd it easier to answer these questions, and to envisage in concrete
form what imperial systems of power and discourses of martial races mean, by
immersing ourselves in case studies. We now offer two of these, at opposite ends
of the scale. The second case study looks at the colonial soldier as military
careerist and part of an imagined military tradition, in the form of two Malay
Regiment soldiers. The ﬁrst, by contrast, examines a whole system. It describes
Geoff Wade’s Ming China as an imperial system of power, makes comparisons
to other systems and asks how the Chinese impact may have helped to shape
modern Southeast Asia.
Case study I: Ming China and its impact on
Southeast Asia
In October 1407 Admiral Zheng He (Cheng Ho) returned to China, two years
after setting forth on the ﬁrst of seven maritime expeditions. Having sailed as far
as Calicut in India, he brought with him envoys, tribute and a captive: the
Chinese ‘pirate’ Chen Zu-yi. The returning Ming Dynasty ﬂeet reported that
Chen had feigned surrender at Old Port, today’s Palembang in Sumatra, while
plotting an attack.
32
Chen had made a deadly mistake. Zheng He’s ﬂeet boasted over 317 vessels.
It included water tankers, 62 treasure ships and more than 27,000 men, including
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10,000 ‘crack troops’. At its peak Ming China’s navy included 400 ships of the
ﬂeet, over 2000 coastal vessels and 250 huge treasure ships, each a gigantic,
multi-masted junk with as many as 500 men on board. The biggest ships bristled
with hand-guns, muzzle-cannon, ﬁre lances and rockets.
33 This was the culmina-
tion of three centuries of development in maritime strength, from the Sung
dynasty in the twelfth century, through the Mongol Yuan dynasty and its attacks
on Japan (1281), Champa and Tonkin (1283–8) and even Java (1293), to the
Ming Dynasty that replaced the Yuan in 1368.
34
Zheng He, who was later to attack Sri Lankan rulers as well, spent two
months hunting down Chen’s forces. Ten vessels were sunk, seven captured, and
over 5000 people left for dead. The alleged ‘pirate’ chief – so-named largely
because he had his own forces controlling the Straits – was hauled back to
Nanjing, presented to the Emperor and decapitated. As for Old Port-Palembang,
many Chinese ex-military and civilians from the southern provinces of Guangdong
and Fujian already called it home. Old Port was recognised as a ‘paciﬁcation
superintendency’ under Chinese Superintendent Shi Jin-qing. China soon estab-
lished two guanchang (depots or staging posts) athwart the Melaka Straits, which
divides Sumatra and the Malayan peninsula. Depots were established at the
ports of Samudera and Melaka (the latter spelt Malacca for the British colonial
period and Melaka for other times).
35
There is a striking parallel between the resulting Ming maritime interlude of
1405–33, and the period between 1786 and the 1840s. In the latter period,
increasing trade in the area preceded the British establishment of ‘factories’ in
the Malacca Straits: at Penang, Malacca and Singapore, with the permission of
local rulers whom they overshadowed. The British, like the Chinese, used select
but overwhelming demonstrations of naval force to overawe, so that afterwards
persuasion sufﬁced, before proceeding to attack piracy with new technology.
British steamships took the place of China’s  ﬁfteenth-century supersized and
gunpowder-armed war junks. The contrast between British persistence for well
over a century and a half, and progression from establishing its own ‘guanchang’
to territorial rule, and the short-lived nature of China’s greatest ﬂeets, is even
more striking than the parallels between their outbursts of maritime dominance.
But Wade’s story can be taken further than the short-lived ‘proto-imperialism’
of Zheng He’s  ﬂeets: maritime proto-imperialism, Wade suggests, because it
shared the mid-nineteenth-century British preference for intervention and inﬂu-
ence short of territorial rule. Zheng He himself, the leader of the 1405–7 expedi-
tion, was arguably one of the most successful ever ‘colonial soldiers’. Originally
named Ma He, he hailed from what is now the southwestern Chinese province
of Yunnan, an area then hosting a number of small, independent kingdoms in its
west, as well as Mongol remnants from the Yuan dynasty.
36 Wade’s chapter
argues that the conquest and absorption of western Yunnan was itself an exam-
ple of Ming landborne imperialism, featuring colonisation by military settlers
and the recruitment of local auxiliary forces.
Wade thus suggests that Ming Chinese ‘imperial’ activity was characterised by
three distinct types of expansion, namely: the ‘proto-imperialism’ of the maritime
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ﬂeets; colonisation in Yunnan; and conquest, albeit short-lived, in Vietnam,
which brieﬂy became the Chinese province of Jiao-zhi (1407–28).
37
Zheng He’s life could be seen as encompassing two, if not three, of these types
of ‘imperialism’. In the ﬁrst place, Zheng He was an imperial victim. His capture
and castration resulted from China’s colonising movement to its west, further
into Yunnan, initially to subdue remnants from the Mongol Yuan dynasty, which
the Ming Emperors had ousted. Ultimately Yunnan would be incorporated into
China, and the history of its Tai and hill peoples separated from that of other hill
groups, who still range across much of northern and upland Southeast Asia.
38
This absorption of Yunnan was part of a process whereby China’s border and
tributary states were gradually domesticated. Even today, when Yunnan’s inhab-
itants have been absorbed and national minorities comprise just 8 per cent of
China’s total population, minorities occupy as much as 60 per cent of China’s
territory. These outer, less densely populated regions look, on a map, like a hand
cupped over China proper. They include Nei Mongol (Inner Mongolia) to the
north where the ﬁngers would stretch out, Xinjiang to the northwest at the crook
of the hand and Xizang (Tibet) to the mountainous midwest. The last named
was the last acquired, or re-integrated, depending on one’s perspective, in 1950.
39
Just like other great land empires, then, such as Rome, or Russia with its drive
to its south and east from the eighteenth century, China expanded and incorpor-
ated border areas inhabited by other peoples, with ‘colonisation’ by Chinese
occurring both before and after, either peacefully or as a result of Chinese
military successes and political domination.
40 As with Russia and the Soviet
Union, China has also grappled with the problem of whether to downgrade
or suppress minority languages and cultures, or to allow them space, and the
dilemma that while suppression and homogenisation may breed resistance,
greater autonomy can generate demands for more of the same, and ultimately
for independence. It is noticeable, for instance, that Kazakhstan, one of the most
successful Muslim successor states to the Soviet Union, borders the Autonomous
Province of Xinjiang (absorbed into China in 1768), where disturbances and a
distinct identity have continued to pose problems long after the proclamation of
the People’s Republic of China in 1949.
41
China was an empire or imperial system itself, which reached its peak under
the Manchu Qianlong emperor (1736–95). Thus conceived, as an imperial wheel
with concentric circles, its core was central China, surrounded by a circle of
colonies (Tibet, Xinjiang, Mongolia, Manchuria and Taiwan), and this in turn
by another circle of tributaries (Korea, Vietnam or Annam, Burma and for a
time Melaka) towards the rim. Hence in 1428 Vietnam did not leave the Chi-
nese system, but crossed from the ﬁrst and second circles (as a ‘province’ in name
and a colony in effect) into the third (as a tributary). Even the core, where non-
Han emperors reigned for long periods, could be seen as an empire or imperial
system, in the sense that it uniﬁed people of different languages and dialects, and
regions and customs, by means of a unitary bureaucracy, while ruling these
peoples without their consent. The Manchu Qing dynasty’s army, with its elite
banner cavalry divided into Manchu, Mongol and Han components, could be
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seen as balancing different groups in order to preserve imperial rule. The de-
imperialisation of the Chinese core might then be seen as a function both of
gradual triumph of common cultural traits and lingua franca over particularism,
and ultimately of the rise of modern Chinese nationalism. This culminated in the
overthrow of the Qing Dynasty in 1911.
42
The description of China’s historical relations with its periphery, and with
some minorities and areas within its borders, as ‘imperial’ does not to presup-
pose any further expansion is likely. Nor does it imply that devolution or
decolonisation is inevitable, at least in the next generation or two. Roman impe-
rialism lasted hundreds of years, absorbing non-Romans as Roman by citizen-
ship, language and culture. China is on an upward curve of economic, and
probably cultural, inﬂuence. Nor is this to deny that security, rather than a
desire for conquest, may have driven a great deal of China’s relations with its
neighbours. But such debate is not merely semantic. Quite the opposite, the
incorporation of neighbouring peoples into a Chinese imperial system, whether
as notional tributaries offering little more than occasional exchanges of gifts (as
Vietnam did into the nineteenth century), or as parts of China itself, has played
a signiﬁcant part in shaping not only China, but Southeast Asia.
Back in the fourteenth and ﬁfteenth centuries, western Yunnan remained to
be fully absorbed by the expanding Ming dynasty. Yunnan abutted powerful Tai
kingdoms and these were subject to further Ming expeditions, following which
traditional rulers or members of their family were recognised by the Ming court
as Military and Civilian Paciﬁcation Commissioners. The latter’s continuing rule
had, as a quid pro quo, the meeting of regular Ming demands in terms of silver,
gold, troops and labour. Classic imperial techniques also included disaggregating
larger into smaller polities, over which local rulers were recognised as ‘Native
Ofﬁcials’, with freedom to rule their own peoples according to customary law.
This was a form of Ming ‘indirect rule’, one used as late as the nineteenth
century for people such as the Miao in Guizhou.
43 It opened these native ofﬁcials
to Chinese interference in their internal affairs, punishment and gradual incor-
poration into the Ming system of administration, every bit as much as it did for
‘native states’ in British India and Southeast Asia, and in the Netherlands Indies.
44
It was as a part of this search for security on the western marches of the
kingdom (and how many empires have expanded in the never-ending search for
security on a ‘turbulent frontier’?) that the future Zheng He was captured.
45
Castration destined the young Ma He to training as an imperial eunuch at the
Nanjing Taixue (Imperial College), where he became a trusted servant of the
third Ming Emperor Zhu Di (c.1403–24), known under his reign name as Yongle.
In turn, perhaps determined to act on a Chinese worldview that depicted itself
as the ‘Central Kingdom’, receiving due homage and dispensing peace to peri-
pheral areas and barbarians (referred to as yi), Zhu Di aimed to take this
expansion further. He may also have been following a pre-existing Ming dynasty
trend towards recapturing control of maritime trade for the state – and turning
it into tribute – and of expanding sea power. The Ming had attempted to ban
private overseas trade as early as the 1370s, while expanding state maritime
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tribute missions. At the least, this might halt the tendency towards autonomous
Chinese centres of power, wealth and possibly piracy growing up outside of
imperial control. Without a doubt, the emperor planned to extend his reach to
the west and south.
46
Zheng He thus focuses attention on some of the manifold aspects of China’s
tribute and ‘imperial system’, and on China’s overlap with the areas we now call
Southeast Asia, but that China then conceptualised as its ‘west’: west by land
and west by sea.
47 Wade’s chapter thus implies that Admiral Zheng He, despite
his stellar career, was in essence an imperial administrator-soldier, a eunuch-
admiral plucked from the western borderlands, trained and sent to extend the
Ming system of tribute relations to the western seas.
On a more prosaic level, Zheng He’s status as a colonial and colonised servant
of the Chinese emperor helped to ﬁt him for the great expeditions he was to
lead, at the head both of expert mariners and craftsmen, and of prisoners and
prisoners’ sons who had been sentenced to exile. His origin meant he was neither
a Confucian traditionalist focused overwhelmingly on the harmony of the Cen-
tral Kingdom itself nor a high bureaucrat needing to remain close to the central
court. His grandfather was of Central Asian origin. The young man had almost
certainly been brought up on stories of India and Arabia, and his last voyage, of
1431–3, was to be his own pilgrimage to Islam’s most holy cities.
Wade argues that Zheng He’s expeditions formed part of a wider Chinese
policy of pacifying and exploiting the crucial trade routes through the Melaka
Strait and associated routes between China and the Indian Ocean: dominating a
kind of maritime silk route.
48 The aim may have been to assert Chinese domin-
ance, as well as to establish tribute relationships, to encourage trade after the
closure of the overland Silk Road or even to seek out a recently deposed and
now vanished ex-emperor, but the result was a kind of a maritime Pax Ming, or
Pax Sinica, from 1405 to the 1430s.
49 As with the Pax Britannica, and American
interventions worldwide after ‘9/11’,
50 this meant attacking ‘failed’ or rogue states
– and perhaps overly independent rulers too, such as those of Old Port-Palembang
and Sri Lanka – setting up bases and making clear a willingness to intervene.
Ming Chinese, as much as British and Americans afterwards, aimed to ‘shock
and awe’ with the foremost weapons of their times. They labelled opposition
‘pirates’, terrorists or rebels at their discretion, and on this basis had them killed
or carried overseas for extrajudicial detention, exile or execution. All three pow-
ers tried to mould the world in their own image by carrot, stick and threat. In
China’s case this included establishing a theatre of global domination, with
foreign envoys encouraged to travel to the capital at Nanjing, and later at Beijing,
with its newly completed imperial complex: the Forbidden City.
In short, this might be seen as an attempt at giving reality to claims to a ‘world
system’ of power, centred on China as the central or Middle Kingdom. As with
the Pax Britannica, large-scale trade by independent merchants had preceded
hard, state-backed imperialism by many years, with Zheng He ﬁnding Chinese
at Melaka and at Palembang. As with American and British systems, the degree
of intervention used – trade agreements, persuasion or brute force – was the
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minimum necessary to integrate areas into a global system of exchange, or to
ensure that they did not threaten the hegemonic power’s economic and military
security. And ﬁnally, as with British and American imperialism, the degree to
which empire or a system of world power supported, and how far it sapped, the
home economy was, and is, open to lively debate.
51 The costs of Chinese imperial
gifts – silver, gold and bolts of silk – and of treasure ﬂeets may or may not have
exceeded the tribute collected.
Wade’s picture of a Ming China expanding westward by land and sea, and
with some colonisation in Yunnan, raises interesting questions. Should China be
considered a ‘Southeast Asian’ regional player or a foreign power? Should South-
east Asia be seen as a distinct, unitary area at all for much of this period? Should
Chinese expansion into Yunnan, now part of the People’s Republic of China,
and into Vietnam be regarded as analogous to later Western imperialism? Some
historians of China may baulk at the language, since ‘imperialism’ long ago took
its place in Chinese history as a pejorative term, mainly reserved for Western
intrusion into Asia. Indeed, some Chinese historians, and also some contem-
porary Southeast Asians, may wish to see Zheng He more as ‘friendship envoy’
for China than a shock-troop of proto-imperialism.
52 That is a far more com-
forting image in what could yet turn out to be the Chinese century.
53
It is certainly true that the eunuch-admiral and his ﬂeets are not our normal
idea of colonial forces. This term is normally understood to refer to non-Western
forces employed in the pay of Western imperialism: the Sikh policeman or the
Dutch-raised  Marechaussee with his modern riﬂe and traditional klewang (short
sword) for ﬁghting in jungle and scrub. Indeed, it could be suggested that what
Ming China conspicuously failed to attempt was the raising of truly colonial
forces on the model of later maritime empires; that is, forces raised in and paid
by overseas territories, and encouraged to view themselves as the loyal military
caste of an advanced power.
Ming China can in this way be seen as an example of imperial power that
failed to raise the overseas forces and taxation regimes necessary to maintain a
cost-effective and durable maritime empire. This despite employing colonial
forces in its landbound empire, in Yunnan, in the shape of the forces of the
native ofﬁces.
It could be argued that Wade’s chapter also suggests an important legacy of
Chinese imperialism: it helped to delineate the region itself. It did this in several
ways: by ‘colonising’ and incorporating some ethnic ‘Tai’ and hill-tribe areas
into what is now Chinese Yunnan, so deﬁning the eastern and northern limits of
Southeast Asia; by intervening in the Melaka Straits in a way that facilitated the
rise of Melaka, and protected it from depredations from Thailand (Siam) and
from Java’s state of Majapahit; and by its failure to consolidate itself in Vietnam,
which then developed its own expansionary impetus, crushed Champa to its
south and attempted to build its own empire.
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Each of these developments marked Southeast Asia in major ways. Melaka,
with its Malay dynasty claiming descent from the preceding, Sumatran-based
Empire of Srivijaya, stamped its mould on successor Malay States across Sumatra,
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the Malayan peninsula and Brunei. These areas still bear that civilisational im-
print. Yet in Zheng He’s day, Melaka had only been a few years in the making,
having been founded around the turn of the fourteenth to ﬁfteenth centuries by
a ruler ﬂeeing Singapore in the face of Thai and Javanese hostility.
55 Melaka
repeatedly sent envoys to the China. China in turn claimed the power to deter
other tributary states, such as Thailand, from interfering with Melaka, and also
claimed to have raised the ‘chief’ of Melaka to the status of king in 1405, and
Melaka to a protected polity in 1410.
56 Melaka as a Muslim Sultanate consolid-
ated itself and thrived precisely in an era of Chinese-led ‘globalisation’, which
was gathering pace by the late fourteenth century, and peaked at this time.
Melaka’s later fall to the Portuguese in 1511 came at a point when China’s
interest and its capacity to project its power had waned.
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In this way a brief Chinese period of ‘globalisation’ was implicated in South-
east Asia’s delineation. Arguably, it was China’s turning away from this imperial
moment, as from the 1430s it faced greater threats from the Asian plains to its
north, that ensured Southeast Asia would be left as a sort of Asian Balkans, a
fracture and splinter zone, beholden neither to India nor to China alone, but a
crossroads where Indian and Chinese and Arab religions, and later a European
veneer of bureaucratic norms, could produce kaleidoscopic variations. Ming
China’s 1407–28 conquest of Vietnam was also to be its last sustained period
of rule there, and Vietnam’s peculiar blend of Sinicisation (in script, Confucian-
ism and more) but anti-Chinese nationalism was to leave it and its northern,
mountainous zone of Tonkin a major barrier to any further Chinese march
southward.
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In other words, the Ming’s decision to limit its land and maritime reach may
have been as important as its earlier decisions to extend it. On 9 May 1421, just
after Zheng He set off on his last great trip – bar the Mecca pilgrimage of 1431–
3 – the Forbidden City, another grand project of Emperor Zhu Di, went up
in ﬂames.
59 Some might have seen this as highlighting the strain, if not futility, of
the emperor’s mega-projects: canal extensions, colonialism, maritime ﬂeets
and the development of Beijing as the new capital with its Forbidden City.
Even before the Yongle Emperor’s death in 1424, and his son’s backing for a
more inward-looking, low-tax, conservative approach, the father’s massive mari-
time ﬂeets were falling out of favour among the mandarins.
Following this, there was a century-long continuation of the ban on private
trading to the west, in addition to the absence of any further tribute ﬂeets to
maritime Southeast Asia. After the ban was lifted in 1567 with the ofﬁcial licens-
ing of trading ships, the western seas were left to private Chinese traders.
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Where the Chinese state retreated,
61 state-backed Portuguese interlopers were
able to intercede from the late ﬁfteenth century, and Dutch and English joint-
stock companies from the seventeenth, leasing and seizing their own guanchang or
‘factories’.
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Three further major imperial systems of power recommend themselves for
study in the same way, as complexes that shaped Southeast Asia. These are the
Dutch, the British and the Japanese. The Dutch United East Indies Company
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from the seventeenth to eighteenth centuries managed to siphon off much of the
proﬁts of international trade through the region, batter Bugis power in Celebes
(Sulawesi) and prevent the emergence of any dominant Malay polity in the area.
Both the Johor-Riau Sultanate and the Acehnese, though still going concerns,
had to settle for maintaining separate identity under difﬁcult conditions. The
British, meanwhile, joined the Dutch in bifurcating a ‘Malay’ cultural zone that
had ranged across the Straits of Melaka (Malacca), notably by the Anglo-Dutch
Treaty of 17 March 1824. This recognised Dutch supremacy south of the Straits,
and British north. The British also ended centuries of Burmese–Thai tension as
British India expanded, gobbling Burma up in three stages between 1824 and
1885. It then played a key role in opening Siam (Thailand) up to low-tariff trade
from the 1850s, and to western advisers and capital (especially British capital)
under the late nineteenth-century reforming King Chulalongkorn (Rama V,
reigning 1868–1910).
The dramatic impact of the Japanese from 1941 to 1945, meanwhile, has
yet to be considered in systemic terms. Chapter 2 makes a genuﬂection in this
direction. Speciﬁcally, it enumerates the Japanese colonial territories in 1940,
and suggests a three circle model of the Japanese empire, with core colonies
destined for a high level of integration and Nipponisation (Taiwan and Korea), a
second tier or circle in Manchuria and China and a third outer rim in the Nanyo
or South Seas. Each played different roles within the Japanese system, and what
from 1940 emerged as a ‘Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere’.
Hence ﬁrst circle colonies featured the direct recruitment of more than 200,000
directly into the Japanese Imperial Army in wartime, and half as many women
as ‘comfort women’, some by trickery, others by force. The different nationalities
in the Imperial Army were not, in contrast to the British and French approach,
formed into completely separate units.
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In the second, more informal or indirect, sphere, Manchuria was notable for
the dominance of the Mantetsu (the South Manchuria Railway concession), the
assertive Kwantung Army, the puppet state Manchukuo, with its own army
after March 1932, and the presence of many Japanese (233,749 by 1930).
64 This
second circle featured the use of indirect imperialism, with the notionally inde-
pendent Manchukuo and the Chinese administration of Wang Jingwei being
notable examples. The latter’s ‘National Government’ of March 1940 to 1945
dominated the core China area around Nanjing and the River Yangtze, of over
a hundred million people, and enthusiastically joined ‘rural paciﬁcation’ cam-
paigns as a matter of anti-communism, and because it needed to extend its own
sway in rural areas.
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By contrast, Southeast Asia was in the third circle, and despite its oil and raw
materials, this meant it was difﬁcult to justify giving it high levels of material.
The Japanese Army spared only 10,000 troops for Java, for instance. Even this
must have seemed a luxury once American island hopping across the Paciﬁc
started to head towards Japan in 1944. By that time declarations of ‘independ-
ence’ for Burma and the Philippines had conﬁrmed, in 1943, that Japan would
be willing to tolerate a high level of autonomy here, in return for collaboration.
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Vichy-aligned French Indochina and Thailand had, after all, retained their
independence. In 1944, Japan’s increasing weakness persuaded it to increase the
use of nationalists, and the raising of militias and youth groups and their mass
inculcation with Japanese seishin, even in Indonesia, whose resources had at ﬁrst
been expected to remain under Japanese control indeﬁnitely. The result was the
training of tens of thousands of pemuda (youth) in the militias and auxiliary groups
so well documented by Abu Talib’s Chapter 9.
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Southeast Asia’s systemic position as a third tier of colonies thus combined
with the turning of the tide in the war to dictate a vast expansion of ‘colonial’
forces there: militias, pemuda youth groups, voluntary forces such as the giyutai
and giyugun, romusha (forced labourers) and auxiliaries (heiho). It also encouraged
and made possible a vast increase in activity by anti-Japanese forces. Both of
these types of force consequently had major impacts on shaping postwar South-
east Asian history. Together these developments not only frustrated French and
Dutch attempts to recover fully their prewar power, but also ensured postwar
insurgency in the Philippines, Malaya, Burma, Indonesia and Vietnam, provid-
ing the framework for Cold War and decolonisation alike.
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In short, the systemic view matters. It allows us to explain better both why
colonial armies in the region took the form they did and how those forces
impacted on the region.
Case study II: Men of the Malay Regiment and martial
races discourse
Now we need to swoop down to ground level, switching from the bird’s eye
or even satellite view of empire to a human scale. For Admiral Zheng He and
his great ﬂeets are not the normal image of colonial forces. The stereotype is of
a non-Western man – always a man – commanded by a Western-controlled
security machine.
68 Volumes on imperial forces look at such men, at their re-
cruitment, management, loyalty, disloyalty and effectiveness in battle, and at
the modernising, social and decolonising impacts on them of service in
nineteenth- and twentieth-century colonial forces.
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For our next example, we turn from the macro to the micro, and from the
Ming dynasty to two twentieth-century Malay soldiers, who between them served
in the British-raised ‘Malay Regiment’ as well as in Japanese wartime forces.
The two men are Adnan Saidi and Ismail Babu, both soldiers of the Malay
Regiment.
What was the Malay Regiment? Until 1932 the Malay States and Straits
Settlements Colony (Singapore, Penang and Melaka, or Malacca as then known)
– together referred to as ‘British Malaya’ – were sparsely defended. In addition
to part-time volunteers, only one British and one Indian battalion garrisoned
them. After the Singapore Mutiny of 1915 the latter was replaced by a battalion
from Burma. Then in 1933 the British, partly under pressure from the Malay
Sultans and also in the light of increasing nationalism in India and Burma, set up
an experimental Malay company to test the ‘martial qualities’ of the Malays.
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The British, having disarmed Malays since 1874, expressed doubt that the Malays
were a ‘martial race’.
Malay recruits were given modern training, but the Regiment’s invented
tradition and symbolism dripped with pseudo-historic ‘Malayness’. There was
Malay-style ceremonial dress, a jawi-scripted badge, which lifted the motto ‘loyal
and true’ from the story of the Malay ﬁfteenth-century warrior Hang Tuah, and
visits from the Sultans. Young recruits were told that they were a test for their race’s
valour. They were also an elite, since limited recruitment meant only the very
best were selected from a ﬂood of applicants. With British preservation of Malay
Sultans as sovereign in their States – albeit with British-advised administrations –
the Malay Regiment could remain loyal both to British ofﬁcers and to Malay
culture and Sultans.
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Shortly after Japanese landings in north Malaya, in December 1941, the
Malay Regiment was expanded from one battalion to two. Its ultimate test was
to come on 13–14 February 1942, when it was holding one of the last lines of
defence before Singapore City, on the west coast of the island, at Pasir Panjang
ridge. Blackburn’s Chapter 12 discusses how the events of those two days have
been enshrined in ﬁlm, literature, school texts and books, and at heritage sites, as
a part of the stories of Singaporean and Malaysian nation-building. This is
where our two Malay Regiment men step into the picture.
The better known of the two is Lieutenant Adnan Saidi (1915–42), of Platoon
number 7, ‘C’ company. His unit grimly held on to Opium Hill overlooking
Singapore’s West Coast before being overrun on 14 February, with an extremely
high casualty rate on both sides. The infuriated Japanese reportedly shot,
bayoneted and then hung him upside down from a tree. This was at a time
when some British and Australian units were beginning to splinter, ahead of the
British surrender on the following day. He is, in a sense, an ideal martyr both for
Malays and for the British as a representative of a ‘martial class’ at last proven.
It is his story that most underlines subsequent commemoration.
But Lieutenant Adnan was just one of several Malays decorated for their
bravery in Singapore’s  ﬁnal defence. Some others were later captured, and
killed upon their refusal to switch allegiance. One, Regimental Sergeant Major
Ismail bin Babu, was to have a more chequered career. For him, the military
was a family tradition and the only obvious route to a more comfortable life.
Ismail Babu was of mixed Malay and Pathan (Indian) parentage.
71 His Pathan
father had served in the Indian Army, and died ﬁghting alongside British forces
on the Somme. Ismail Babu himself became a King’s Scout, and was later
awarded an MBE (Member of the Order of the British Empire) for gallantry in
1947, for his part on 14 February 1942.
So far so good, but he did not die a martyr. After jobs as a railway labourer
and charcoal factory clerk, he sought to improve his growing family’s lot by
joining the Japanese giyutai (volunteer militia corps) of Malaya. This deployed
him against mainly Chinese anti-Japanese forces. Near the war’s end he left this
and joined Britain’s Force 136, an organisation inﬁltrating to work alongside
anti-Japanese ﬁghters. Finally, after the war he rejoined the Malay Regiment,
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retiring in 1967 as a major. Abu Talib recounts this fascinating career in his
Chapter 9, so giving a glimpse into a world where military honour and calling
blended with calculation to shape decisions taken under stress.
In some ways the very success of the British approach, of nurturing groups
such as these Malays as ‘martial races’ or castes, had within it the seeds of
ambivalence. In the case of many Indian Army soldiers captured in Malaya
by the Japanese, this facilitated their recruitment into the Japanese-sponsored
‘Indian National Army’ (INA). That same army eventually fought the British in
Burma under the nationalist slogan ‘On to Delhi’. The very success of the British
model could thus produce loyalty, efﬁciency and a sense of calling. But the
loyalty was not to King and ofﬁcers alone, but more powerfully to ideals of
military service, honour and a cultural identity that could take on its own im-
petus. In the absence of British control and ofﬁcers, those same attributes could
result in loyalty even to the death, or in dramatic realignments.
In the careers of both men, then, we see evidence that the British proved
masters in the art of sculpting ‘martial races’. They used regional tradition, caste
and historical memory to nurture a sense of military calling and honour, espe-
cially in India. As Womack hints in Chapter 4, the French sometimes viewed this
with keen interest, if not envy.
Nor can the British creation of ‘imagined’ military traditions be seen as en-
tirely arbitrary. When recruiting Sikhs in India, for instance, the British insisted
on outward signs of the Khalsa Brotherhood, the wearing of the kirpan or dagger,
keeping uncut hair in a turban and carrying the Guru Granth Sahib or holy
book at the head of the unit on march. In other words, the British insisted on the
elements that most sharply distinguished Sikhs from the Hinduism that origin-
ated their movement – or any chosen military group from its neighbours.
72 In
addition to such manipulation of identity markers, and creation of regimental
tradition, people from preferred recruiting grounds could be given precedence in
civil suits, reliable pay or plots in retirement. The heart and the wallet were
made to work together.
It is no surprise, therefore, that Omissi can argue that ‘The idea that some
Indians were more martial than others was not a pure ﬁgment of the colonial
imagination’.
73 It had roots in the customs and self-image of groups such as the
Rajputs, castes such as the Kshatriya and notions of masculinity, which the
British fostered and built upon.
Works such as Echenberg’s Colonial Conscripts, dealing with French colonial
troops in Africa, echo these themes. Such soldiers became imbued with what
Philip Mason calls A Matter of Honour, the title of his book on the Raj.
74 Omissi
refers to this as ‘izzat’: a sense of honour and standing for the soldier, caste,
family and regiment. One might, perhaps, add a sense of prestige and superior-
ity from being attached to a modern organisation and given extra education and
skills. These may in turn have helped soldiers to distance themselves from the
crowd, especially when called on to do dirty ‘policing’ work.
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At the same time, the ‘martial caste’ approach could encourage essentialist
and ossifying classiﬁcatory fantasies, and intensify divisions. Robert Taylor’s
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Chapter 8 is revealing in showing the lengths the British went to in classifying
Burma’s so-called ethnic groups and subgroups. Such communally-based conjur-
ing of categories was self-fulﬁlling in encouraging some groups, and discouraging
others, from enlisting. It also, as we have already noted, tended to produce
plural armies, which might reinforce divisions in society, with dire consequences
for postcolonial states such as Burma (Myanmar).
Was it something akin to izzat, the Indian concept of honour, or a sense of
being part of a ‘modernising’ and civilising empire, even a globalising force on a
higher plane, that drove on Zheng He in 1407–33? How far did these same
forces motivate the Gurkha riﬂeman or the ‘Ambonese’ in Dutch employ? Altern-
atively, how far were men driven by the need to use skills and traditions to
ensure family survival in hard times, while escaping mundane lives for adven-
ture, as with Timorese levies, or with Ismail Babu as he signed up as a giyutai?
Are these factors the most central to colonial soldiers’ behaviour, or should they
be seen, for the most part, just as ordinary soldiers, motivated in battle by a
more general sense of brotherhood under ﬁre?
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It is not easy to answer such questions. But we do know that colonial forces
remained, for the most part, loyal up to and even into the process of decol-
onisation. Even colonial troops from majority populations, often discriminated
against in thought if not in conditions, usually underpromoted and sometimes
underarmed, remained for the most part loyal and effective, at least up to the
Japanese Occupation. Perhaps that sense of brotherhood in arms, plus the basic
attractions of secure pay, promotion and pension, while serving in an institution




This introduction provides three broad themes that link together what follows,
and together constitute a clarion call for more comparative work on imperial
power, together with greater terminological and conceptual rigour.
The  ﬁrst theme is that ‘colonial armies’ need to be located within bigger
frameworks. These need to encompass both the broader security matrix in each
individual territory – including naval, military, police and auxiliary labour power
– and the overall imperial context. In thus locating colonial armies, studies need
to be terminologically exact in how they describe types of imperial action, and in
developing typologies for colonial forces.
The second theme is that of discourses of loyalty and disloyalty, especially
as manifested in attempts to create martial races or castes, and to control
supposedly unreliable groups. Study of this area needs to feed through into
wider themes of identity formation within colonial contexts, and of national-
ism. The category of military castes must be taken seriously as a distinct type
of imagined community: imagined from above by imperial authorities, from
below by subjects and from beyond the grave of empires and by postcolonial
subjects.
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This type of approach has to be careful to distinguish varying types of reason
for loyalty – indigenous and martial traditions, the natural bonds of a martial
‘band of brothers’, disciplinary measures and more – and for revolt, especially as
between ‘loyal’ and ‘disloyal’ revolt. The mutinies in French Indochina, which
challenged the very raison d’être of the colonial state, are a good example of the
latter; that in the Philippines in 1924, which sought better conditions, of the
former. Finally, studies needs to be self-conscious about just how far aspects of
force behaviour are speciﬁcally  ‘colonial’, how far they are manifestations of
more pervasive characteristics of military units and their men.
The third broad theme is that we need to extend the range of circumstances
in which we apply the imperial or colonial military paradigm. Pre-European
and post-European periods can sometimes beneﬁt from such analysis. Asian-
sponsored armies, Ming Japanese or contemporary, may sometimes be amenable
to categorisation as imperial. At the same time, even when a situation becomes
‘postcolonial’, the issue of the memory of colonial forces, and the use of that
memory politically, may remain salient. This can be seen for both the ex-colony,
as in Malaysia and Singapore, and the metropolis, as in the case of ‘Moluccan’
and ‘Ambonese’ soldiers demilitarised in the Netherlands after 1949. However
we look at it, to restrict the category of imperial almost entirely to examples of
Western deployment of non-Western forces is in itself a sort of racism.
Last but not least, this chapter hints at the way studying not just ‘colonial
armies’ but also ‘systems of imperial power’ can open up broader, and import-
ant, areas of analysis. First, it allows us to see how Ming China, nineteenth-
century Britain, twentieth-century Japan and twenty-ﬁrst-century America all
wrestled, and in the last case still wrestle, with a similar problem: how to manage
the very biggest systems of power without overstretch and underperformance.
Policing the frontier, how to train local forces without losing control of them,
who to choose as allies when one’s friend’s enemy will become your enemy too
and how to turn ‘imperial’ areas into security producers in partnership, rather
than truculent security consumers: these are perennial themes.
Another such broader theme is the impact of the very greatest imperial sys-
tems of power on Southeast Asia itself. Ming China clearly helped to protect the
Melaka seedling from the Thai and Javanese attacks that destroyed its predeces-
sor on Singapore, so setting the scene for six hundred years of Malay history. It
also broke up a Tai cultural zone that had joined western Yunnan with what are
now Thailand, Laos and upland Myanmar. Its manner of failure in Vietnam,
meanwhile, could be seen as helping to form Vietnam into a bulwark against
further Chinese expansion southwards. Ironically, its failed intervention there
may even have helped to strengthen Vietnamese military organisation, and so
set Vietnam off on its own expansion, including the conquest of Champa in what
is now central and southern Vietnam. The Dutch clearly siphoned off the proﬁts
of much of the international trade passing through maritime Southeast Asia, and
through naval supremacy probably prevented the rise of any new hegemonic,
indigenous power in insular Southeast Asia, such as Srivijaya or Majapahit.
Dutch and British control of international trade, and actions against local states,
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seem also to have dispersed indigenous forces as ‘pirates’, so justifying further
Western ‘policing’ of the seas and coastlines in the ﬁrst half of the nineteenth
century.
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The British also joined the Dutch in splitting a Malay cultural world, in which
the Straits of Malacca had bridged rather than separated Sumatra and the
Malayan peninsula. In 1824 everything south of the Straits (until 1871, except-
ing Aceh) was recognised as in a Dutch sphere, everything north as in a British
sphere of inﬂuence.
All the major European powers, meanwhile, brought with them or later intro-
duced traditions of imperial force, which included ‘divide and rule’ techniques.
This meant creating plural colonial armies: armies where men were either put
into different units according to ‘race’ or treated differently according to race,
and where men of different origins met on the parade ground but remained
socially separate castes. These plural armies could have negative impacts on
postcolonial states, notably so for Myanmar. Beyond these, the Japanese imperial
system helped to propel the peoples of Southeast Asia from a colonial to a
postcolonial trajectory. Again, that it did this was due not just to Japanese aims,
but to the particular position of Southeast Asia within the imperial system the
Japanese were constructing. That is, it was for Japan the third of three circles,
one where the Japanese resorted to lower metropolitan troop numbers and a
greater use of Japanese-sponsored armies and militias, as the core homeland and
ﬁrst two tiers came under greater threat.
These are but crude hints of what more analytical, comparative and systemic
approaches could achieve. Even then, this chapter does not go far enough in
setting the scene for the individual dramas that the following chapters bring us.
For colonial armies, and even imperial systems and patterns of power, are insuf-
ﬁcient frames of reference in themselves. As the next chapter, ‘Demography and
domination in Southeast Asia’, shows, the extraneous also has to be contextualised
against the indigenous, the imperial against local populations and terrains.
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